v   Legacy of American & Russian Expansion:

Ø    Sense of special mission in history for both

Ø    Growth of missions to global dimensions – 20th century

Ø    Contrasts in political, economic, & social cultural attitudes

Ø    Absence of conflict or cross purposes until Nov 1917

Ø    Origins of US-Soviet diplomatic conflict:

§       Balancing geo-strategic interest vs. ideological values

v   Assessment – Wilson’s Ideological Conflict:

Ø    Wilson’s idealistic world view:

§       International cooperation

§       Collective security

§       Self-determination

§       Free & open markets

Ø    Wilson’s view of Bolshevik regime

§       US motives & actions taken as a result

Ø    Impact on Soviet attitudes toward West:

§       Soviet fear of Western capitalism & encirclement


v   Assessment – FDR’s Wartime Diplomacy:

Ø    Recognition of Soviet Regime (March 1933)

§       Unfulfilled expectations & disappointment

Ø    FDR’s main wartime Soviet Policy Goal? 

§       Obstacles inhibiting  success: isolationism

§       Maintained access to Soviets (post Sept 1939)

§       Promised & pursued 2nd Front

Ø    Was FDR naïve?

§       Wartime vs. postwar priorities

§       Rejection of Churchill’s Balkan strategy

§       Overestimating his ability to pursued

§       Postponement of hard political decisions

§       Minimizing Churchill’s concerns to the end

Ø    Did FDR mislead Stalin wrt US concerns in East Europe?

§       Proclivity to avoid confrontation

§       Spin or efforts to avoid hard political choices

Ø    Assess impact of FDR’s political priorities:

§       Practical geo-political vs. idealistic interest?

§       Effect on Atlantic Charter principles?

§       Would harder line approach made any difference?

§       Could Soviet actions in E. Europe been precluded?

 

v   Assessment – Truman & Containment:

Ø    Key Policies, Strategies, & Doctrine shaping Cold War:

§       Cold War became main arena for competition & conflict:

§       Demonstrated through Truman’s adoption of:

·       Containment thesis & rationale:

¨     Kennan’s Long Telegram;

·       Truman Doctrine:

¨     states official US position to contain communism

·       Marshall Plan:

¨     Economic means to achieve Containment’s end

·       NSC-68:

¨     Military Strategy to achieve Containment

·       NATO:

¨     Military means for Containment in Europe

§       Soviet’s Response:

·       Molotov Plan: (reaction to Marshall Plan)

¨     Tied Eastern Europe to Moscow’s economy

·       Berlin Blockade:

¨     Failed Soviet response to growing western influence

Ø    on Western Germany (Bizonia);

·       Warsaw Pact:

¨     NATO’s counterpart

¨     Soviet military alliance of East Europe

·       Stalin’s hard line on Eastern Europe:

¨     Hope fades for democracy in East Europe;

 

 

Ø    Three Interpretations of Cold War’s Origins:

§ Orthodox: mainly the Soviets are to blame;

§ Revisionists: USSR defense concerns & Capitalist greed;

§ Post-revisionist: both side contributed to Cold War;

 

Ø    Summary of specific arguments:

§ Orthodox:

·       Soviet behavior & its aggressive actions;

·       Fundamental Ideological conflict;

·       USSR support for world communism

·       Soviet support for 3rd World liberation movements:

¨    Linked to Soviet motives of expansion;

·       Misunderstandings attributed to FDR’s spin;

 

§ Revisionists:

·       Soviet concern for security – defensive in nature;

·       US fabricated fears & myths:

¨    Aim: make world safe for capitalism & invest.

 

§ Post-revisionist:

·       All of the above contributed to CW origins;

·       Strategic security gained through economic means;

·       Overall US objective:  preponderance of Power;

 

v   Expansion of Containment to the Third World:

Ø    Assessment – Eisenhower & Dulles:

§       US-Soviet competition for 3rd World allegiance grows:

·       Tendency to confuse Nationalism w/Communism;

¨     Result: US aligned more w/right wing dictators

¨     Growing trend toward covert actions to fix problems

Ø    LATAM, Iran, & Africa

§       Khrushchev’s  aggressiveness also contributed to tensions:

·       Support for Liberation movements strain relations

·       Partly due to Khrushchev’s ambition for influence;

·       Motive: Remain leader of communism ahead of China


 

Ø    Kennedy & Johnson- Flexible Response & Limited War:

§       JFK’s & Khrushchev’s personality conflict:

·       Significant factor in US-Soviet relations;

§       JFK’s resolve & insecurity also factors in poor relations:

·       Determination to forge “new generation” of leadership;

·       Humiliation at Bay of Pigs fiasco;

·       Khrushchev’s attempt to exploit & challenge JFK:

¨     Berlin, Cuba. Vietnam, & Congo;

·       Personality conflict almost ended in Nuke war (Cuba)

§       Failure of containment in the 3rd World:

·       JFK failed to reverse Castro’s Cuba;

·       LBJ failed to defeat North Vietnam communists;

·       Result: Vietnam Syndrome in future conflicts;

§       On Positive side: tentative beginning of Detente:

·         Limited Test Ban & Non-proliferation treaties;

 

 

 

 


v   Nuclear Arms Race:

Ø    Ike, Massive Retaliation, the New Look, & Roll Back:

§       Ike threaten to use Nukes off China & to end Korea War

§       Nuclear arms race motivated by fears of coming in 2nd:

·       Applies to varying degrees to both sides:

¨     For US– motives of Military Industrial Complex

¨     For USSR – propaganda conceals Nuke weakness

§       Khrushchev miscalculated US reaction: fear of missile gap

·       Spurred US efforts to build up Nuclear arsenal

Ø    JFK & the Brink of Nuclear War:

§       Most dangerous era of the Cold War:

·       Event that marked closest yet to Nuclear War?

§       Issues contributing to deterioration of US-Soviet relations?

·       Berlin problem;

·       Soviet attempt to challenge US Nuclear superiority;

·       Khrushchev’s attempt to preclude US invasion of Cuba;

§       Sobering impact of Cuban Missile Crisis:

·       Conflicting motivations:

¨     Avoid future direct confrontations & escalations

¨     Search for ways to reduce nuclear tensions

¨     For USSR: pursue parity as rapidly as possible:

Ø    Soviet Nuclear missile build-up

v   Failure of US-Soviet Détente:

Ø    Assessment- Kennedy & Johnson & Détente:

§       Motivated by close call of Cuban Missile Crisis

§       Initiated early beginnings of Détente:

·       Hot Line, Test Ban Treaty, & Nuc. Non-proliferation

§       Revised US Nuclear Deterrence Strategy  - MAD (parity)

Ø    Assessment- Nixon-Ford & Détente:

§       Ever the pragmatist => motive: US geo-strategic interests

·       Soviet & Chinese assistance to end Vietnam War

¨     Triangular Diplomacy:

Ø    Isolate North Vietnam from its supporters

·        Constrain Soviet Nuclear Weapons –SALT ( parity)

§       Soviets motivated to ease tensions for own reasons:

·       Western economic & technology assistance

·       Deteriorating Chinese relations- border conflicts

·       Eastern Europe: Soviet unease with potential unrest

·       Reduce East-West tensions => free to deal w/China

§       Soviet’s still persisted in support its client states:

·       So no reason to halt aid to Vietnam, Syria, Egypt, Cuba

·       Also aided 3rd World Liberation Movements - Angola

§       Yom Kippur War ‘s impact on US-Soviet détente:

·       Mistrust heightened - signaled beginning of the end

Ø    Détente’s rapid demise:

§       Soviet restrict Jewish emigration & require $30K tax

§       Congress undermined Nixon’s Quiet Diplomacy:

·        Jackson-Vanik Bill precludes MFN trade status

§       Debate over nature & purpose of Détente ensued:

·       Conservative critic’s position:

¨     Too much for too little in return (RR);

·       Liberal critic’s position:

¨     Continued violations of human rights

·       Critic’s thesis & supporting rationale:

¨     Soviets still committed to 3rd World Revolution

¨     Détente merely tactical & temporary accumulation;

Ø    Changing “correlation of Forces” to USSR favor

¨     Supporting evidence:

Ø    Parity achieved with US on Nuclear Weapons;

Ø    Loss of US prestige & credibility with 3rd World:

§       Loss of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola;

·       Soviet assertiveness further Critic’s arguments:

¨     Breach of Helsinki Final Act & human rights:

Ø    Soviet promises not worth paper written on;

Ø    Détente just another form of appeasement;

§       By Mar76, détente in grim decline & Kissinger irrelevant

Ø    Assessment – Carter’s role in ending Détente:

§       Carter entered Whitehouse w/Wilson’s idealism, and:

·       Strong commitment to human rights

·       Desire for improved US-USSR relations & détente

§       Carter sought cooperation & accommodation for 3 years:

·       Attempted to solve most issues & problems w/Soviets

¨     Issues of US-Soviet mutual interest to solve:

Ø    Stop proliferation to Nuclear Weapons

Ø    Contain & resolve Regional conflicts

Ø    Protect Human Rights (flawed assumption?)

§       But by Carter’s departure – Détente was in shambles:

·       Carter felt betrayed  by Soviet invasion of Afghanistan:

¨     Overreacted & ignored other important areas

·       Covert support to Islamic “freedom fighters”(stingers)

·       FP often deadlocked & conflicting (Zbig vs. Vance);

·       Carter often paralyzed by indecision & mired in detail

·       Carter’s rigid idealism often only made matters worse

§       USSR bears blame but Carter seems more naive than most


 

v   End of the Cold War:

Ø    Assessment – evaluating critical links & determinants:

§       Key Questions: The Cold War ended as a result of what?

·       US policies & their contribution to Cold War’s end?

·       Collapse of Soviet $$$ from within?

·       Undermining of people’s faith in communist system?

§       Was Reagan was instrumental in ending CW because of:

·       Steadfast ideology?   Military buildup?

·       Full Court Press & economic impact on Soviets?

·       SDI & sincere desire to eliminate all Nukes?

·       Decision to take Secretary of State Shultz’s advice?

¨     Influence on Reagan over that of hardliners?

·        Reagan’s choice to act - when & how he did act?

§       Role of Congress & Public Opinion?

·       Tired of Nuclear sword hanging over World?

·       Lack of Congress & Public support for covert Actions?

¨     3rd World, Iran-Contra, Nicaragua, etc.?

§       Was the Soviet system itself rotten from within?

·       Was communism the glue that held USSR together?

·       When the glue deteriorated => USSR became unstuck?

·       Did above actions make it all fall apart=> to end CW?

§       Gorbachev’s role in ending the Cold War?

·       Recognized vulnerability of Soviet economy?

·       Took actions to reduce tensions & $$$ arms race?

·       Revised long held ideological views re. East-West?

¨     From inevitable conflict to cooperation?

·       Side effects of Perestroika & glasnost?

·       Poorly executed reform measures – half measures?

·       Profound lack of understanding the forces unleashed?

§       Actions taken by members affected by historic events?

·       Eastern European satellites & their response?

·       Constituent republics inside the USSR itself?

§       What role did Bush play?

·       Concessions Gorbachev forced to make to West?

·       Assurances to allow Gorbachev to accept unified Germany & also member of NATO

·