v

v Nixon & Détente’s Revival:

Ø Nixon – the pragmatic realists:

§ Inaugural address: “era of negotiation;”

§ Nixon’s Priority: US interests first & foremost;

· Whatever was required to achieve them– so be it:

¨ Including: Cooperation with communist states;

§ US Reasons & motives for improved US-USSR relations?

· Soviet/China assistance to get out of Vietnam:

¨ Strategy: isolate NVN from its key supporters;

· Constrain Soviet nuclear program (SALT):

¨ (Soviets had reached parity);

· Concern for prospect of Soviet built ABM system;

§ Soviet Reasons & motives for improved US relations?

· Lock in & preserve just achieved nuclear parity:

¨ Strategy: SALT accord to halt US MIRV advantage;

· Fix Economic problems:

¨ Poor grain harvest & industrial growth;

· Need for Western $$$ & technology assistance;

· Eastern Europe: Soviet unease with potential unrest;

· Deteriorating Chinese relations- border conflicts;

¨ Potential escalation to Sino-Soviet War;

· Reduce East-West tensions => free to deal w/China;

Ø Henry Kissinger – Nixon’s National Security Advisor:

§ Key intellectual architect on new policy approach;

§ Innovative strategic plan to encourage Soviet cooperation:

· Enmesh USSR in mutually beneficial relationship;

· Carrot & stick approach:

¨ Reward Soviets for cooperation;

¨ Check & contain undesired Soviet behavior;

· Strategic Linkage- applied to progress on SALT:

¨ Strongly supported by Kissinger;

¨ Linked any progress on SALT to areas of US interest:

Ø Soviet cooperation in issues involving:

§ Indochina, Middle East, & Berlin;

§ Soviet Reaction to Kissinger’s Linkage Strategy?

· What did this linkage imply?

¨ Soviet higher need for SALT vs. US need;

¨ Result: slow start for Detente;

Ø Nixon Doctrine & National Security Strategy:

§ Follows National Security Strategy Review (July’69):

§ Similar to JFK’s Flexible Response Strategy – why?

· US to deter communists expansion at all conflict levels:

¨ Both Nuclear and Conventional;

· But with what key difference?

· Nixon’s National Security Strategy key difference:

¨ US prepared to fight 1 ½ Wars (vice 2 ½ Wars):

Ø I.e. from Europe and Asia + limited war – to:

Ø Europe or Asia + limited war (Vn or Korea);

Ø Conclusion drawn from above about the threat?

· Nixon’s Doctrine & SALT considerations:

¨ Combat role to be borne by allies w/US support:

Ø To include: Nuclear, conventional, logistic assist;

¨ Impact on US Military Force Structure?

Ø Conventional Force draw down (1969-75):

§ USAF: 169 down to 110 air squadrons;

§ USA & USMC: 23 down to 16 Divisions;

§ USN: 976 down to 495 ships;

Ø Nuclear component? – (superiority too $$$):

§ “sufficiency” – (unacceptable damage);

§ Modified target emphasis?

· Counter-force vs. counter-value (?)

§ Alternative to what Nuclear Strategy?

· Whose administration?

§ Counter-force strategy allowed US advantage:

· i.e. Maintain lead over Soviets in warheads:

¨ How? What was US technological lead?

¨ SALT considerations & issues (continued):

Ø US technological lead: MIRV;

§ Soviet lead? (more launch vehicles);

§ Nixon administration’s response in late 1971:

· Accelerate development of B-1 & Trident:

· Why? type strategy & target employed for?

Ø ABM issue - defense versus offense:

§ Soviets want to limit only defensive weapons:

· Why? Restrict US ABM development;

· (want to catch up to US MIRV level);

· Exploit Soviet advantage of more launchers;

§ US wants to limit both types (why?);

· US already has MIRV capability;

· Avoid giving advantage to Soviets;

· Lock in status quo;

Ø Ostpolitik & Berlin:

§ US attitude toward improved East Europe relations?

· Go slow – let linkage strategy evolve & take hold;

§ Chancellor Willy Brandt’s attitude?

· Pushed for normalization of East-West relations;

§ Kissinger’s concerns about Brandt’s Ostpolitik?

§ Kissinger’s Ostpolitik concerns:

· Undermined linkage strategy (SALT & Vietnam);

· Weakened NATO;

· Pressed for “Four Power Agreement” on Berlin:

¨ Precondition to final approval of any treaty;

Ø Soviets & West Germans;

§ Soviet motives for Détente?

· Divide NATO;

· Freeze status quo in Eastern Europe;

· Free Soviets to deal exclusively with China;

§ Soviet strategy to promote détente with West Germans:

· What basic issue in Europe must Soviet resolve 1^st?

¨ German issue – reach Berlin Agreement;

Ø Additional benefit to Soviets gained as a result?

§ Improved prospects for SALT agreement;

§ Provision of Western $$$ aid & technology;

Ø Meanwhile – Nixon plays his China Card:

§ Takes initial steps toward improve US-China relations:

§ (Earlier indications: Oct ’67 article in Foreign Affairs):

· “US must come to grips with reality of China.”

§ Nixon’s motives & incentive:

· Expected benefits from improved US-China relations?

· Expected benefits from improved US-China relations:

¨ Provides US with political leverage with Soviets;

¨ Gain China’s favor to facilitate Vietnam withdrawal:

Ø “Peace with Honor” (sic);

§ China’s attitude toward US-China rapprochement?(Why?)

· Brezhnev Doctrine (1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia);

· Ussuri River conflict & attendant escalating tensions;

· Demonstrate China’s resolve to resist Soviet pressures;

§ China also important to US Geo-strategic interests:

· Nixon sends message to Soviets:

¨ “US will protect China’s survival from USSR Nucs”;

¨ SAC placed on highest Nuclear alert in Oct’69:

§ Deter potential Soviet Nuclear attack on China;

§ Nixon takes concrete steps to ease US-China tensions:

· Reduce threat to China’s southern tier (July 1969):

¨ Troop reductions in Vietnam (549.5K to 484K);

¨ Suspend USN patrols in Taiwan Straits;

Ø Also halts US supported covert ops;

· Permits travel to China;

· Rescind $100 limit on Chinese goods;

§ Chinese Response to Nixon’s overtures?

§ Chinese invite US delegation at Warsaw to Beijing:

· (subsequently cancelled May 1970 –why?)

· Proves only temporary set-back for improved relations;

§ Kissinger’s secret talks (Fall 1970):

· Secret diplomatic channel with Zhou Enlai;

· Both agree in principle about Taiwan’s status- what?

¨ (One China Policy?)

· South Vietnam’s future TBD by Vietnamese;

§ Invitation extended by Zhou Enlai – significance?

· Nixon’s response?

¨ Accepts & provided additional concessions:

Ø Lifts trade embargo;

Ø Halts spy flights over China;

Ø Reverses decision to place Nucs near mainland;

Ø Withdraws US opposition to China’s seat on UN;

· Major shift in US priorities toward Communists China:

¨ Normal relations with China trumps Taiwan’s;

§ Impact of improved US-China relations on Soviets?

· Effect on Soviet negotiations with US?

Ø Soviet – American Breakthrough – 1971:

§ Improved US-China relations prompt Soviet concessions;

§ Several treaties and tech. & trade agreements approved:

· SALT obstacles resolved:

¨ (separate offensive & defensive weapons categories);

· Joint US-USSR Space mission agreement (Oct’70);

· No nuclear weapons on seabed or ocean floor (Feb’71);

· Measures taken to reduce accidental Nuc. war (Sep’71);

· Progress made on European Security Conference;

· Soviets to participate in MBFR talks;

· Quadripartite Treaty on Berlin approved (Aug’71);

¨ Soviets guarantee unimpeded road/rail access;

¨ West Berliners allowed to visit East Berlin 1mo./yr;

· Trade agreements promoted & approved:

¨ US to sell Soviets $136B in grain;

¨ Soviets reopen Lend-Lease settlement talks;

¨ Nixon to try to get Congressional approval for MFN;

§ Brezhnev invites Nixon to Moscow Summit:

¨ May 1972 set as date for visit;

§ Moscow Summit almost disrupted – why?

Ø Indian – Pakistan War (1971):

§ Outbreak of hostilities almost derails Moscow visit;

· Focus: East Bengal (soon to be Bangladesh);

§ India supports Rebels – Soviets back India;

§ Pakistan attempts to put down rebellion:

· China backs Pakistan (US also supports as well);

§ US reaction when India overruns East Bengal?

· Nixon places military on alert;

· Warns Soviets to restrain India;

· Declares US will use force if India attacks Pakistan;

§ Tensions escalate:

· US Navy sends Task Force to Indian Ocean:

· Soviets pressure India to wrap up its operations:

¨ India complies;

§ Strategic Outcome?

· Bangladesh becomes independent state;

¨ US ally defeated; Soviets gain diplomatic “face”;

¨ Pakistan withdraws from SEATO in disgust;

· India accelerates Nuc. weaps program–detonates in ‘74;

Ø Nixon’s China Trip (21-28 Feb 1972):

§ Why was Nixon’s visit to China praised as historic?

Ø Nixon’s China Trip (21-28 Feb 1972):

§ Ushered in major change in US policy toward China:

· Dramatic improvement in US-China relations;

· US had reversed its policy held since 1949;

§ Nixon meets Mao & both issue what?

· Shanghai Communiqué:

¨ Stated separate positions on Taiwan’s status;

¨ What was common to both separate positions?

· US stresses peaceful settlement by Chinese themselves;

· US gives incentive to China to help US out of Vietnam:

¨ Establishes linkage to US withdrawal from Taiwan;

Ø US to withdraw troops as tension in area declines;

Ø i.e. Reduce US threat to China’s southern tier:

§ (depart faster if China helps w/North Vietnam);

§ Impact of visit?

· Dramatic improvement in relations:

¨ Trade, travel, tourism encouraged;

¨ Senior US representative established in Beijing;

· Also diplomatic fall out on peripheral:

¨ Japan’s Sato government falls (not consulted by US);

¨ Taiwan is biggest loser – states US can’t be trusted;

Ø Nixon’s New Vietnam Strategy:

§ New Strategic Aim: “Peace with Honor”:

· Withdraw our troops & get our pows back;

· Maintain RVN’s independence for decent interval;

§ Strategy to accomplish above aims - Vietnamization:

· Gradual reduction & pull out of US troops;

· Provide RVN with adequate turn-over of operations;

· Provide state of art equipment & logistics support;

· Vietnamization:

¨ 1969: 65K troops withdrawn;

¨ 1970: 50K more out; 1971: 250K out;

¨ 1971: “last ground combat troops out”;

Ø exception: SOF advisors;

§ Kissinger pursues 2 track approach to Peace:

· Negotiations between NVN & US:

¨ Objective: military settlement => US withdrawal;

· Negotiations between Saigon & NLF:

¨ Objective: decide status of SVN’s political future;

· Following agreement – Conference on Int’l Safeguards;

¨ After which – US no longer obligated to SVN gov.

§ What is the conflict between Nixon & Kissinger re. above?

§ Nixon – Kissinger Conflict over peace settlement:

· Nixon wants peace that lasts (Peace with honor);

· Kissinger just wants a settlement & to move on;

Ø Paris Peace Talks:

§ “Dual Track” strategy fails – why?

· North Vietnam rejects – why?

¨ Political & military settlement inseparable;

¨ Demand US unilateral pull out;

¨ Expulsion of Thieu government – replaced by PRG;

Ø (read PRG = National Liberation Front – NLF);

§ Impact of Vietnamization & US unilateral troop pull outs?

· Undermined US bargaining leverage – why?

· North Vietnam’s strategic aim & incentive to negotiate?

¨ North’s alternative strategy: US domestic politics;

Ø US peace movement to apply pressure (Fonda);

§ Result: Paris Peace talks breakdown:

· Peace demonstrations in US escalate;

· Congressional pressure to withdraw mounts;

§ Nixon’s Response?

· “Silent Majority” speech & public’s positive reaction;

· Impact of “silent majority’s” reaction on negotiations?

§ Impact of “silent majority’s” favorable reaction:

· Kissinger gets more time to negotiate w/Le Duc Tho:

· Talks still remain deadlocked into April 1970;

Ø Cambodian “incursion” (Spring 1970):

§ Background: Viet Cong sanctuary & supply link;

§ Khmer Rouge threaten Phnom Penh;

· Right wing mil. Leader Lon Nol request US assistance;

§ Nixon’s motive for incursion?

· Fears negative impact on SVN (& on US pull out);

¨ Especially if Cambodia turns communist;

· Impact of incursion?

¨ Serious domestic complication for Nixon’s strategy;

Ø Nation wide demonstrations & student riots;

Ø Kent State shootings by National Guard;

Ø Self imposed restraint on future cross border ops;

Ø Laos – South Vietnam incursion (early 1971):

§ Background: Kissinger offers NVN cease fire in place:

· Motive: entice North to sign peace settlement;

· Major concession – but not accepted – why?

¨ VC not ready for prime time yet;

· North now sees opportunity- what is it?

§ NVA sees opportunity to accelerate its infiltrations;

· Build up NVA troop levels in South;

· Bolster VC in preparation to take over government;

§ Therefore – North rejects Kissinger’s offer:

· Demand ouster of Thieu & replacement by PRG;

§ US response & operational objectives?

· Slow NVN troops/supplies along Ho Chi Minh Trail

¨ Authorize & support incursion by SVN into Laos;

Ø (also SOF conduct covert actions on Trail);

§ Tactical, Strategic, & Political Results?

§ After Laos – Kissinger offers 2 additional concessions:

· US pledges to w/d all 6 months after agreement signed;

· Thieu to resign 1 month prior to SVN elections;

§ North Vietnam’s response to Kissinger’s new offer?

§ Kissinger’s conclusion in late ’71 re. North’s intent?

· Kissinger decides to isolate North Vn from its sponsors;

· How?

· Strategy employed to accomplish isolation?