v JFK: Confrontation & Cooperation:

Ø Intro: Soviets indicate interest in improving relations:

§ Following JFK’s inauguration, Khrushchev:

· Sends warm congratulations;

· Releases 2 captured AF officers;

§ JFK responds positively:

· Lifts import restrictions on Russian crabmeat;

· Proposes increase in consulates & sci/culture exchange;

§ Obstacles to improved US-USSR relations remain:

· JFK very suspicious & wary of Soviet motives;

· JFK feels need to prove anti-communist toughness;

· Khrushchev harsh rhetoric bars improved relations:

¨ Soviet support for “wars of liberation” in 3^rd World;

§ Soviet talk about 3^rd World liberation alarms JFK:

· JFK convinced US must focus on 3^rd World challenges;

§ Key Questions to consider:

· Did JFK over-react to Soviet actions & CW rhetoric?

· Did JFK personalize issues & escalate them to crises?

· If so, why? reasons? (ideological, political, psych? );

· When did JFK pursue diplomatic progress w/Soviets?

Ø Cuba & the Bay of Pigs:

§ Approved CIA invasion commences April 17, 1961:

· Fiasco: poor planning, OPSEC, intelligence, execution;

· Strategic & Tactical surprise blown- Castro ready;

· No avenue for retreat if/when op goes bad (it did);

· JFK withdraws US CAS at 11^th hour – disaster:

¨ 1189 out of 1400 invaders captured (lucky ones);

· JFK humiliated & embittered (toward CIA & military):

¨ Allen Dulles fired – JCS mistrusted (signed off);

§ JFK becomes more aggressive in future 3^rd World matters:

· Laos – uniforms for advisors;

· RVN- considers expanded military aid & support;

· DOD – request supplemental appropriations;

· Cuba – Operation Mongoose;

Ø Alliance for Progress:

§ JFK’s attempt to contain communism through $$$ means:

· Fix the problem at the source of discontent in LATAM;

· $10B over 10 years for reform programs:

¨ agrarian, tax, urban/rural housing, health, etc.

¨ assumption: 2.5% economic growth per year;

· Result: failed – why? Pop. & $$$ growth mismatch;

¨ LATAM dictators & US political priorities;

Ø Vienna Summit & Laos:

§ JFK proposes status quo balance of power to Khrushchev:

· Aim: avoid any action that might endanger peace;

§ Khrushchev response? Why?

· Exception?

§ Laos: both leaders accept status quo:

· JFK rejects Ike’s suggested military support to Loyalist;

· JFK refuses to involve US in Laotian conflict:

¨ JCS estimate of 60K necessary for victory excessive;

¨ Risk China’s intervention (Korean war experience);

¨ Khrushchev: no reason for Soviet involvement–why?

· Results: accepts British proposal for cease fire;

¨ Negotiations for resolution at Geneva talks;

¨ Terms accepted at Geneva circumvented by alcon;

Ø Berlin Crisis of 1961:

§ Tone of Vienna Summit strained & contentious:

· Khrushchev proposed German Peace Treaty to JFK:

¨ Rejected: why?

Ø Implied recognition of de facto borders;

Ø Major shift in control over Berlin – by who?

Ø Impact on military presence & access to Berlin?

§ Khrushchev’s threat if JFK refused his proposal?

· Dec 1961 Deadline for American acceptance;

· Separate treaty with East Germany;

· JFK’s response to Khrushchev’s threat: Cold Winter!

§ Soviet reaction to US rejection of German Peace Treaty:

· Suspension of Soviet Army reductions:

¨ Increased spending on military by 1/3;

· Khrushchev OKs construction of Berlin Wall (8/13/61);

§ JFK’s reaction to above actions:

· Kennedy’s view Soviet & East German provocations?

¨ Threat to West Berlin’s survival;

¨ Test of US commitment to entire free world;

· Sends armed convoy down Autobahn & 159K call up;

§ JFK willing to risk escalation to Nuclear War over Berlin?

§ When & how was Berlin Crisis defused?

· Berlin Wall proposals;

· Khrushchev’s peace feelers for negotiated settlement;

§ Fallout resulting from crisis:

· Soviets resume Nuclear tests as cover for climb down;

· JFK orders resumption of US tests in response;

Ø Flexible Response:

§ Impact on current (Ike’s) US National Security Strategy:

· JFK’s reassessment of Massive Retaliation strategy:

¨ Affect on property defended;

¨ Risk of escalation over non vital interests;

¨ Realistic options needed for all levels of conflict;

· Result: US National Security Strategy revised:

¨ Impact on Nuclear Deterrence?

¨ Other lesser options expanded – how?

Ø Diplomacy;

Ø Covert action (CIA & special mission units);

Ø Counter-insurgency (SOF);

Ø Conventional Forces;

· Force structure modifications needed to conduct above:

¨ Conventional forces increased:

Ø USN: double number of ships;

Ø USA: expanded from 11 to 16 divisions;

Ø USAF: TACAIR increased to 23 squadrons;

§ Airlift expanded by 75%;

Ø Special Forces & Navy SEALs established;

¨ Defense budget increased by $50B to pay for it;

· Special Group for Counter Insurgency (CI):

¨ Ad hoc 15 mbr committee chaired by CJCS Taylor;

Ø Created by NSAM 124;

Ø Purpose: to establish political level oversight to:

§ “Insure proper recognition thru-out US government that subversive insurgency is a major form of political-military conflict that is equal to conventional warfare”…and:

§ “… insure development of inter-departmental programs in support…” of CI programs.

· Other associated coordinating groups created:

¨ At the Whitehouse: 303 Committee:

Ø Executive control of covert action worldwide;

¨ At the Pentagon: SACSA (Gen Krulak USMC):

Ø Special assistant for counter-insurgency &

Ø Special activities;

· Also expanded Nuclear arsenal– more target flexibility:

¨ SECDEF McNamara’s expanded Nuclear Strategy:

Ø Counterforce vs. counter-value strategy?

¨ Avoid all out nuclear war with enhanced 2^nd strike:

Ø US to strike military targets as 1^st priority;

Ø Assumption: Soviets agree w/US rationale;

¨ Unintended results? Arms Race (Sov. Missile Gap);

Ø Encouraged use of built up conventional forces;

Ø Cuban Missile Crisis:

§ Background:

· Khrushchev attempts to emplace missiles in Cuba:

¨ deploy 36 MRBM & 24 IRBM in Cuba:

· US intelligence detects & informs Whitehouse;

§ Khrushchev’s motives:

· Offset US Nuclear superiority;

· Redress growing threat to Russian homeland:

¨ US growing Nuclear arms imbalance;

¨ McNamara’s counter-force strategy;

· Deter US from another invasion of Cuba;

· Perhaps: force a breakthrough on Berlin stalemate;

· Domestic benefits: distract attention from bad harvest;

· Solidify Soviet global Comm. leadership (over China);

§ JFK’s reaction? No Way! Why?

· US Geo-strategic interests;

· Personal test of leadership;

· National address: demands immediate removal:

¨ Issues stern warning to Soviets;

· Places US military on full alert & orders blockade;

§ Khrushchev’s response?

§ Note: threat of Nuclear exchange never closer;

§ Long term impact of Soviet response to crisis?

· Khrushchev ousted Oct’64 by Brezhnev;

· Soviets accelerate Nuclear arms build-up;

¨ Aim: parity by end of decade;

Ø Limited Test Ban Treaty:

§ Positive outcomes of Cuban Missile Crisis:

· Strong desire on both sides to avoid war:

¨ Sought negotiations in future;

· Khrushchev invites intensified effort on Nuc. Test Ban:

¨ JFK accepts (now more secure & confident);

· JFK makes conciliatory speech at American University;

¨ (see excerpt in Judge);

¨ announced US intent to stop atmospheric Nuc. tests;

¨ Khrushchev encouraged by speech – signs Hot Line;

· NTL> comprehensive treaty too hard (why?)

· Limited Test Ban Treaty is back-up: Parties agree to:

¨ Prohibit Nuclear tests in atmosphere;

¨ Also in space and below the sea;

¨ Result? (where tests now conducted?):

Ø Therefore arms race continued in changed venue;

· NTL> established precedence for future arms talks:

¨ Arms control agreement now integral to US strategy;

Ø Sino-Soviet Split:

§ Soviet desire for improved US-USSR relations:

· Two fold reasons:

¨ Reduce risk of Nuclear War;

¨ Free Soviets to deal w/growing hostile China;

§ Reasons for China-Soviet split?

· 2^nd Taiwan Strait Crisis;

· Soviet Nuclear Weapons assistance;

· Test Ban Treaty with US;

· Public condemnation by China of 22^nd Congress;

· Contrasting priorities: ideology vs. geo-strategic;

Ø Kennedy & US relations with China:

§ JFK’s initial attitude about US policy toward China:

· Possibility of change;

· Relaxation of embargo;

§ China’s initial interest in improved relations;

§ What happened?

· Domestic hard liner political influence;

· Unanimous Congressional Resolution on Taiwan;

· Result? JFK drops peace feeler & supports India;

¨ Confers w/USSR wrt mil.Action against China Nucs;

Ø Kennedy & US relations with Africa:

§ Ideology & Campaign Rhetoric vs. geo-strategic interests;

§ US geo-strategic priorities: Europe vs. Africa (no contest);

§ Containment of communism vs. African nationalism;

§ Bottom Line: US Cold War priorities trump all others;

Ø Kennedy & the Peace Corps:

§ Capstone of JFK’s contribution to 3^rd World:

· Consistent with idealistic motives of JFK;

· Humanitarian contributions to Africa, Asia, LATAM:

¨ At its height: 15K American volunteers overseas;

· Some CIA covert action activity in contested areas:

¨ Limited use of cover noted in a few instances;

§ Overall assessment of program:

· Positive & altruistic goals & purpose: positive impact;

v LBJ: Confrontation & Cooperation:

Ø The Johnson Doctrine:

§ Johnson’s Personality:

· Wheeler-dealer & man of action;

· Domestic political master & policy focus;

· Foreign policy novice;

§ Johnson Doctrine’s Aim: protect America’s “backyard”:

· Contain communism from LATAM;

¨ “By whatever means is required.”

· Biggest threat to US interests in LATAM?

· Prime motivator for doctrine & associated policies?

§ Example: Panama (Jan 1964):

· Johnson ignores Panamanian national aspirations:

¨ Blames who for infiltrating what?

· Following Panamanian riots, US offered changes:

¨ Arrangements for new sea-level channel made;

¨ Defense & neutrality of existing canal agreed to;

¨ Recognition of Panama’s sovereignty over zone;

¨ For above US concessions, Panama agreed to:

Ø Continued canal operation by 5/4 commission;

Ø US retain military bases in Canal Zone to 2024;

§ (US involvement in Panama continued):

· Panama’s National Assembly rejects above agreement:

¨ Core issue for Panama: National Sovereignty;

¨ Johnson’s response? Panamanian reaction?

¨ No change until 1978 (by who?);

§ LATAM unrest & its impact on Alliance for Progress:

· US dissolution with program’s effectiveness:

· Severe funding cuts in program;

§ Instead- significant increases in military assistance:

· Provided primarily to whom? (right-wing Mil. Elite);

· US Motive: prevent need for US intervention in region;

· Result? US intervention viewed as still required:

¨ Dominican Republic: 22K USMC (April 1965):

Ø Prevent Gov. overthrow by “pro-Castro rebels”;

Ø “Big Stick” replaces 30 yrs of “Good neighbor”;

¨ DOMREP & LATAM Reaction?

¨ LBJ successfully seeks face-saving OAS assistance;

§ LBJ expands involvement throughout LATAM nations:

· Brazil: US offers USN support to overthrow leftist prez;

· Chile: $3m covert funding to elect anti-comm. Ed Frei;

· Bolivia: Special Forces support to track down Che’;

Ø Johnson & Vietnam: (to be covered in detail next week)

§ LBJ wanted badly to focus on US domestic issues:

· But: frustrated by growing US involvement in RVN;

§ US involvement in Vietnam also affected other nations:

· US policies shaped accordingly toward them;

Ø Johnson & China & Soviet Union – a failed diplomacy:

§ Viewed: China key force in spread of communism in Asia;

· (Re-enforced by key domestic event in China in 1966)?

¨ 10s of thousands purged throughout China;

¨ Millions lost jobs; 500K lost their lives;