§       FDR: Diplomatic Recognition of USSR (1933):

¨     Non-recognition recognized as failure – why?

§       Soviet structure unchanged;

§       Anti-capitalist activities continue;

§       US- Soviet trade prevented;

¨     Other influencing factors?

§       Reality: Soviet Union existed;

§       Growing US International role – can’t ignore;

§       National Security Considerations =>

¨     Growing international threat;

¨     Balance of Power implications;

 

§       Soviets Aware of US Strategic Potential & Role:

¨     End Isolation: seek collective security;

§       Objective: check Germany & Japan;

¨     Join League of Nations;

¨     Form Alliance with France & Cz;

¨     Seize upon FDR’s offer for normalization;

§       Start Negotiations w/FDR Administration;

§       Two Major Obstacles to normalization;

¨     Resolve COMINTERN issue;

¨     “Understanding” reached on Debt;

 

§       US Recognizes USSR:

¨     Bullitt becomes first US Ambassador to USSR;

¨     Disillusionment and Misunderstanding  results;

§       US limits support to USSR against Japan;

¨     Not willing to risk war;

§       Debt continues to hamper improved relations;

¨     Major obstacle to US Trade & Credits;

§       Other Major Obstacle: Ideology differences?

¨     Fundamental incompatibilities;

¨     Free Market vs. Communism;

¨     Revives COMINTERN;

§       Stalin conducts purges of 1936-38;

¨     Further undermines US-Soviet relations;

 

§       Growing Axis Threat- 1935-36:

¨     March 1935: Hitler rearms Germany:

§       Violation of Versailles Treaty;

§       Allies fail to respond (problem?);

¨     Oct 1935: Mussolini invades Ethiopia:

§       League of Nations’ response?

¨     March 1936: Germany Remilitarizes Rhineland:

§       Allied Response & its impact?

 

¨     1936-39: Spanish Civil War:

§       France fails to intervene;

§       Germany & Italy tests tactics & doctrine;

¨     Late 1936 - early 1937: Axis Pact completed;

§       Germany, Italy, & Japan vs. western Allies;

 

§       Appeasement now official policy of Britain & France:

¨     Led by Chamberlain & abetted by France;

§       Slippery slope to war;

¨     US complained but remained uninvolved;

§       US Isolationism revived;

§       Congress passed Neutrality Acts;

 

§       FDR Collaboration Attempts- Obstacles to Cooperation:

¨     FDR determined to estab. US-Soviet relations;

§       replaced Bullitt with Davies;

¨     Strong USG opposition to improved relations:

§       Navy successfully opposes BB construction;

¨     FDR seeks opportunities to educate public:

§       Growing Axis threat;

§       Japanese attack on US gunboat;

¨     FDR Seeks to establish US-Soviet military liaison;

§       Debt issue resurfaces & FDR backs off;

§       Growing Axis Threat Continues (1938-39):

¨     March 1938: Anschluss:

§       Significance & Allied reaction;

¨     Sept 1938: Munich Conference:

§       The high mark of Appeasement;

§       Allied rationalization for its lack of response;

¨     March 1939: Germany occupies Prague:

§       Hitler’s true aims revealed- even to Chamberlain;

§       Britain promises to assist Poland & Romania;

§       May 1939: Pact of Steel established;

 

§       Soviet – German Non-aggression Pact – Aug 1939:

¨     Allies fail to conclude alliance w/USSR;

§       Mistrust, suspicion, reluctance;

¨     Hitler seizes diplomatic opportunity;

§       Pact signed August 1939 – surprise to Allies;

 

¨     Significance of Pact:

§       Green light for Hitler;

§       Secret Protocol for Stalin;

§       US (DOS) conclusions about Stalin;

 

 

§       World War II Begins:

¨     1 Sept 1939: Germany Invades Poland – “Blitzkrieg”:

¨     3 Sept Britain & France Declare War on Germany;

¨     Poland surrenders 27 Sept 1939;

¨     US enacts embargo against “aggressors”:

§       FDR exempts Soviets – why?

 

§       US-Britain Strategic Partnership – Lend-Lease:

¨     Change in US Public Opinion;

¨     Congress revises Neutrality Act – “cash & carry”;

¨     May 1940: France falls – Britain stands alone;

§       Churchill replaces Chamberlain;

¨     German SS force threatens Britain’s economic LOC;

§       FDR exchanges old US DDs for British Bases;

¨     Impact: Too little too late;

¨     Lend-Lease Act enacted:

§       Congress provides $7 Billion in appropriations

§       Significance of Lend Lease?

 

 

                            

§       June 1941: Hitler invades Russia:

¨     Surprising only Stalin who ignored US warnings;

¨     Churchill offers Stalin help – asks FDR to join him;

§       FDR agrees – wants to keep USSR in War;

 

§       US Foreign Policy toward USSR now shifts:

¨     Geo-Political Interest trump Ideology;

¨     Focus: keep Soviets in War – w/whatever it takes;

§       US thaws frozen Soviet assets;

§       Permits US Transports of supplies to Vlad.;

¨     Direct US aid discussed by FDR advisor Hopkins’

§       1.5 tons/$1Billion in supplies promised;

¨     Post-War boundaries to complicate aid to USSR;

§       Stalin insists on post-Sept’39 Soviet gains;

§       FDR postpones resolution until War’s end;

¨     Stalin presses for 2nd Front in West (France);

§       Contentious Allied issue throughout War;

 

§       Allied War Aims & Stated Principles of US & Britain:

¨     Atlantic Charter & its impact and significance:

§       No territory;

§       Respect for people’s choice of government;

§       Freedom from fear & want;

§       British and American Strategic Planning:

¨     American Strategic Priority for War Determined;

§       Navy disagreed – why?

¨     Major “Big 3” grand strategy issue throughout war?

§       Gen Marshall & JCS position & rationale;

§       Churchill’s position & rationale;

§       British Alternative: Operation Torch;

§       Stalin’s reaction as Germans advance;

¨     Post-War boundaries Soviet priority;

¨     Western Front continued to be delayed:

§       FDR persisted with positive spin on delay;

§       Stalin remembers & distrusts FDR’s duplicity;

 

§       Wartime Allied Conferences:

¨     Casablanca: Churchill’s agenda pressed on FDR:

§       3 part strategy to maintain Med/Balkan focus;

§       JCS reaction (easier transition from Op Torch);

§       FDR’s reaction to Churchill’s strategy;

§       Terms of Axis surrender discussed:

¨     Ultimate War Aim determined (FDR);

§       Stalin’s reaction to delayed western front:

¨     Probably already knew (Kim Philby);

¨     Rejects Sicily as  substitute to 2nd Frt;

§       Tehran Conference (Nov-Dec 1943) – “Big Three”:

¨     Background & Conference Preparation:

§       Italy already invaded & surrendered;

§       Germany takes over fighting in Italy;

¨     Hull & Eden inform Molotov of Overlord -2nd Front;

§       Soviets pleased – promise cooperation;

§       Sign Declaration on General Security;

§       Promise to stay the course – significance?

§       Support United Nations (FDR’s agenda);

¨     Big Three meet late Nov:

§       Stalin strongly supports OVERLORD;

¨     Also Anvil (Southern France);

§       Political issues & decisions taken & postponed:

¨     Status of  post-War Germany;

¨     Poland’s Boundaries & Government; Allied Disagreement & postponement;

¨     United Nations role, mission, structure;

¨     “4 policemen” vs. regional security;

¨     Conference marked high point of Big Three unity;

§       But most contentious issue left unresolved;

§       Seeds of misunderstanding & mistrust?

 

 

§       Moscow (Oct 1944): Post-war “Spheres of Influence”:

¨     Churchill and Stalin bargain future of Europe;

§       Geo-political interests vs. Ideological values;

¨     Churchill’s concern regarding Soviet rapid advance:

§       Soviet dominance: Balkans & E. Europe;

§       Unsuccessful attempt to get Anvil cancelled;

§       Failed attempt to get FDR to divert troops:

¨     Balkans, Austria, Southern Hungary;

§       FDR’s focus firmly on approved strategy;

§       Churchill pursues alternative strategy on own;

¨     “Realpolitik” agreements on back of an envelope:

§       Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe accepted;

¨     Romania & Bulgaria;

§       Britain dominate influence in Greece accepted;

§       Equal influence in Hungary & Yugoslavia;

 

§       Yalta (Feb 1945): Final Meeting of Big Three:

¨     Focus: Post-war Germany’s future;

§       Occupation Zones outlined;

§       Disagreement over Partition details;

§       Reparations: disagreement over amount;

§       Soviet request for US loan & assoc. problems:

¨     Previous debt history surfaces again;

¨     Most Difficult Issue of Yalta Conference?

§       Poland’s post-war status - issues?

¨     Pro-Soviet Government recognition;

¨     Borders: Curzon Line & Order/Neisse;

§       Post-war gov. make-up most contentious;

¨     Soviet demands friendly government;

¨     FDR insists on “free elections”;

¨     Compromise: Tripartite Commission;

 

¨     Far-East Asia Agreements:

§       Post-war Japan’s status & administration;

§       Post-war Korea’s status & administration;

§       Soviet conditions for war with Japan:

¨     Southern Sakhalin Island;

¨     Kurile Islands;

¨     Manchurian Ports access;

¨     China East & South Manchurian RR;

¨     Continued influence in Outer Mongolia;

§       FDR’s acceptance with caveat;

 

¨     Soviet Occupation of Iran:

§       Conditions for withdrawal: Oil concessions;

§       Unresolved: to resurface at start of Cold War;

§       Post-Yalta Impact:

¨     FDR: “Major step toward peace”?

¨     FDR’s priority: Grand Alliance vs E. Europe façade;

¨     Poland’s Government composition;

¨     Soviet cooperation with West after war;

¨     FDR’s usual response to difficult issues w/Stalin?

§       Indecision, rationalization, and compromise;

§       Avoid confrontation and equivocate;

§       Maintain Grand Alliance unity at all costs;

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

§       Assessment – FDR’s Wartime Diplomacy:

                   FDR’s main Soviet Policy Goal? 

                             Obstacles inhibiting  success;

                             Maintained access to Soviets (post Sept 1939);

                             Promised & pursued 2nd Front;

         

                   Was FDR naïve?

                             Wartime vs. postwar priorities;

                             Rejection of Churchill’s Balkan strategy;

                             Postponement of hard political decisions;

                             Minimizing Churchill’s concerns to the end;

         

                   Did FDR mislead Stalin re. US concerns in E. Europe?

                             Proclivity to avoid confrontation;

                             Spin or avoid hard political choices;

 

                   Assess impact of FDR’s political priorities:

                             Practical geo-political vs. idealistic interest?

                             Effect on Atlantic Charter principles?

                             Would harder line approach mattered?

                                    Could Soviet actions in E. Europe been precluded?